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Abstrak
Perdebatan teoritis dalam bidang hubungan sipil-militer telah didominasi oleh teori pemisahan yang 
mengakui perbedaan antara lembaga sipil dan militer, dan interaksi antara mereka harus dipertahankan 
sebagai dalam bentuk yang sipil memegang kontrol atas militer. Namun, Rebecca Schiff mengusulkan 
teori konkordansi sebagai alternatif yang menunjukkan suatu bentuk integrasi antara militer dan 
masyarakat. Teori konkordansi digunakan sebagai model analisis untuk mengatasi faktor-faktor 
sejarah dan budaya dalam hubungan sipil-militer Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan empat 
aspek konkordansi sebagai instrumen untuk mengukur apa tingkat kesepakatan dapat dicapai antara 
militer, elit politik, dan masyarakat. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa meskipun faktor sejarah dan 
budaya telah memainkan peran penting dalam membentuk hubungan sipil-militer di Indonesia, mereka 
gagal untuk membangun hubungan sipil-militer baik yang didasarkan pada gagasan supremasi sipil. 
Kata kunci: teori konkordansi, hubungan sipil-militer, faktor sejarah dan budaya, supremasi sipil.
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Abstract
The theoretical debate in area of civil-military relations has been dominated by separation theories which 
recognize the distinction between civilian and military institutions, and the interaction between them should 
be maintained as in a form that civilian holds control over the military. However, Rebecca Schiff proposes 
the concordance theory as an alternative that suggests a form of integration between the military and society. 
This theory of concordance is used as a model of analysis for addressing historical and cultural factors in 
Indonesian civil-military relations. The study uses the four aspects of concordance as instruments to measure 
on what level of agreement can be achieved among the military, political elites, and society. The result shows 
that although historical and cultural factors have played important roles in shaping civil-military relations in 
Indonesia, they fail to build good civil-military relations which is based on the idea of civilian supremacy.
Keywords: the concordance theory, civil-military relations, historical and cultural factors, civilian 
supremacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The existence of civilian supremacy over military is a key factor in understanding civil 
military relations where the current theories hold that civil supremacy over military is the sine qua 
non of civil-military relations. The issues first raised by Huntington in 1957 included the dominant 
notion that military could not undertake other roles, such as direct or even indirect involvement in 
domestic politics, without impairing their essential military capabilities1. This means that there has to 
be a distinction tasks undertaken by civil and military organization within a government, and military 
should remain physically and ideologically separated from civilian political institutions in order to 
prevent domestic military intervention.
1Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge Mass.: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. Page: 89.
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By contrast, Rebecca L. Schiff in Armed Forces & Society journal proposes a theory of 
concordance as an alternative approach that argues that three partners – the military, the political elites, 
and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation 
but does not require it2. The theory sees a high level of integration between the military and the other 
parts of society as one of several types of civil-military relationship. Because all such relationships 
reflect specific institutional and cultural conditions shared by the three partners, no single type is seen 
as leading to an ideal type of relationship.
In the concordance theory, Schiff criticizes the two major problem of the current theory of 
separation that the concordance theory resolves. First, the current theory is derived largely from 
the experience of the United States, and assumes that American institutional separation on civil-
military relations should be applied to all nations. Moreover, she argues that the case of civil-military 
relations in the United States is grounded in a particular historical and cultural experience and may 
be inapplicable to other countries. Second, the current theory argues for the separation of civil and 
military institutions which institutional analysis is the theory’s centerpiece. Schiff argues that this 
method of analysis fails to take into account the cultural and historical conditions that may encourage 
or discourage civil-military separation. Moreover, the Concordance theory argues that if the cultural 
conditions have successfully constructed agreement among the military, the political elites, and the 
society, then the civilian supremacy will be maintained3.
On the other hand, Indonesia civil-military relationship has strongly been influenced by 
particular historical experience and cultural factors since the state independence in 1945. However, 
it is also true that Indonesia has suffered a longstanding military intervention into civilian political 
spheres. This contradicts to Schiff’s argument in the Concordance theory. It is, therefore, interesting 
to explore in this study how historical and cultural factors have affected Indonesia civil-military 
relations and to explain why they fail to prevent domestic military intervention.
In addressing how the historical and cultural factors affect civil-military relations in Indonesia, 
the study focuses on measuring those factors in the four areas of concordance: (1) the social composition 
of the officer corps, (2) the political decision-making process, (3) the recruitment method, and (4) the 
military style.
1. Composition of the Officer Corps 
The concordance theory recognizes the composition of military elites as a primary element 
in addressing civil-military relations. The officer corps is defined as the career soldiers who dedicate 
their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military. They usually represent the various 
constituencies of the nation. In Indonesia, this element is very crucial due to the plurality of the nation. 
It is important to note that Indonesia has more than 3.000 ethnic groups throughout the archipelago 
of more than 14.000 islands. The cultural difference among ethnicities and nation’s components may 
lead to a various articulation that affects the agreement of the three partners over the composition of 
the officer corps.
There is also another problem in addressing the composition of the Indonesian military 
officers that the related researches and literatures were very limited in contributing information 
about social and cultural background within the Indonesian officer’s corps. There are two reasons for 
this difficulty. First, Indonesian military, and Indonesian people in general, are prone to avoid inter-
relating their professions with their ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds. The terms of SARA-
Suku, Agama, Ras, or ethnicity, religions, and race is viewed as a potential source for communal 
2 Rebecca Schiff. 1995. “Civil-Military Relations: A Theory of Concordance”. Armed Forces 
&Society. Vol.22:1. Page 7.
3 Ibid. Page: 8.
KRITIS    Jurnal Sosial Ilmu Politik
Universitas Hasanuddin
197
Vol. 1, No. 2, Desember 2015
violence that threats the unity of the nation, therefore, it should be disregarded as much as possible. 
Although many civilian and military leaders claim that neither religion nor ethnicity will be regarded 
in official assignments, in fact, these cultural elements, more or less, still play significant roles in any 
process of recruitments and promotions. Second, as Kammen and Chandra state that military is likely 
to safeguard information about its inner structure and activities4. The issue of “national security” is 
always being an acceptable justification for military to keep its secrecy.
Despite the scarcity of the current data about cultural background of Indonesian military 
officers, the research focuses on two aspects of culture in analyzing composition of the officers. 
Those cultural factors are ethnicity and religions of the military officers. It also should be noticed, as 
it noted earlier, that the research takes the army as primary emphasis based on the reality that from its 
earliest time, the Indonesian army has been played a significant role representing military in discourse 
of civil-military relation in Indonesia.
First, ethnicity in Indonesian military officers tends to parallel the country’s population as a 
whole, although precise percentages of the various ethnic groups at senior levels of the TNI do not 
exactly reflect the percentage of ethnic groups in the country population. The current data shows 
that Javanese dominated across the military elites. Local recruitment of enlisted soldiers tends to 
concentrate Javanese in the many units on the island of Java. And they also tend to be well represented 
in the off-Java units as well, reflecting both the preponderance of Javanese in the Indonesian population 
at large and their residency throughout the country.
The domination of military by Javanese is not merely caused by its bigger proportion in 
population, but also by historical reason. First, most of the early Indonesian military officers, 
including Sudirman and Suharto, came from the PETA that established by Japanese in Java Island. 
During the World War II, the Japanese army controlled Java and Sumatra, whereas the navy ruled 
East Indonesia. In practical level, the Japanese army applied different policies from the navy, 
including the decision to establish PETA, while people in outsider islands had a little experience of 
military training. Second, Indonesian revolution for independence was largely fought on the island of 
Java. Therefore, the Indonesian military was firstly established and developed within the context of 
independence struggle in Java Island. Outside Java, the independence wars against the Dutch were 
conducted by informal resistance and militia groups, not by the army that was officially established 
in Java on October 5, 1945. After the Dutch recognition of Indonesia’s independence in 1949, many 
of militias groups outside Java expressed their disappointment of the central government decision to 
integrate ex-Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL-Koninklijk Nederlandsch - Indische Leger) into 
the Indonesian armed forces. This was to bring several rebellions at outsider islands, such as PRRI/
Permesta rebellions in Sumatera and Sulawesi.
As the consequence of the Javanese domination in the officer corps, Indonesian military culture 
has been constructed by strong Javanese values and traditions. The significant Javanese cultural heritage 
that can be found in the military is the integration of governmental and military leadership. According 
to Cheong, the Javanese political behavior can be characterized by its concern over the accumulation 
and concentration of power5. This is similar with Peter Britton’s argument that, in the past, the Javanese 
kings often came from great warriors who always referred themselves as ksatrias or knights with noble 
qualities6. Therefore, analyzing Javanese culture provides us an explanation why the Indonesian military 
4Douglas Kammen & Siddharth Chandra. 1999. A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military 
Politics in Indonesia in the 1990’s. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. Page: 15.
5Yong Mun Cheong, 1988, “Perspectives on the Military and Development in Indonesia”. In J. 
Soedjati Djiwandono et. al. Soldier and Stability in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies. Page: 94.
6 Peter Britton, 1996. Profesionalisme dan Ideologi Militer Indonesia. Jakarta: LP3ES. Page: 11.
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that dominated by Javanese officers tends to intervene in civilian political affairs.
Second, in contrast to the ethnicity factor within the TNI where Javanese as majority plays 
significant roles in shaping the military culture, the fact of a big number of Muslim population in 
Indonesia does not represent a strong Islamic influence in military. The predominance of the Javanese 
in the officer corps has an important consequence for the political orientation of the military. Unlike 
the people of the Outer Islands who are in general unambiguously Islamic in religious commitment, 
Javanese is much referred as Muslim abangan, whose adherence to Islam is often tenuous and 
combined with non-Islamic beliefs and practices. For longstanding civil-military relations in 
Indonesia, the Indonesian military as an institution has been distrustful of political Islam resulting in 
continuing tension between those two fractions. The relations between the military and Islam can be 
explained through two arguments. First, there is suspicion in the military that sees political Islam as 
a threat to the stability of the state. Second, the military leadership has itself been largely dominated 
by the secular nationalist group.
The military’s experience in suppressing political Islam dates back to the revolution and the 
Muslims rebellions in the 1950s and 1960s. The first tension was between the Lasykar Hisbullah, an 
Islamic militia unit under the Masyumi (Muslim Party), with the army in 1945. Lasykar Hisbullah 
refused to integrate into the army when the government declared the formation of the BKR (Badan 
Keamanan Rakyat), the former name of the TNI, on 5 October 1945. In 1950s and 1960s, there were 
various Darul Islam rebellions in Java and Sulawesi, which their objective was to establish an Islamic 
state of Indonesia. However, these conflicts can also be seen as disputes between local and central 
government troops.
Apart from those conflicts, there have been a number of incidents in which violence has been 
incited in the name of Islam. In 1981 Komando Jihad hijacked the Woyla aircraft and subsequently was 
ambushed by the anti-terrorist unit of Kopassandha (former name of Indonesian elite force Kopasus). 
The Tanjung Priok incidents of September 1984, in which nine Chinese were killed by extremists and 
about 50 demonstrators were shot when they threatened to attack a police station. The bombing and 
arson campaign in protest against the 1985 laws restricting the use of religious affiliation and symbols 
for political mobilization. The latest incident, the Bali bombing in October 2002 resulting in more 
than two hundred dead and many more injured, and Jemaah Islamiyah is accused of being behind 
the action. Consequently, these incidents have increased the military awareness of the threat of Islam 
extremists and widen the gap between the military and the political Islam.
The friction between the military and Islamic political movements in politics can also be 
analyzed by the religious composition of the military elites. According to Rabasa, the number of non-
Muslim officers, more particularly Christians (12 to 13 percent), shows disproportional composition 
to 8-10 percent of the Indonesian population at large. And even though Muslim officers still dominate 
the proportion of the military elites, there is only about 20 to 25 percent who represent santri or strict 
Muslims, and the rest are abangan or nominal Muslims7. The consequence of this disproportional 
composition is the military has been greatly influenced by the abangan perspective that had little 
sympathy for the goals of political Islam. The religious composition within the TNI led to the division 
of the officers’ corps into ‘green’ (Muslim) officers and ‘white and red’ (secularist-nationalist).
The assignment of General Moerdani as commander of the armed forces in 1985 can be seen 
as the victory of the ‘white and red’ fraction to block the Islamic influence within the military at 
that time. Moerdani brought Christian officers into important intelligence and command positions in 
numbers that were far out of proportion to their share of the military’s population. For instance, Badan 
7 Angel Rabasa & John Heseman. 2002. The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, 
Politics, and Power. RAND Publications. Page: 62.
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Intelejen Strategis (BAIS), or Strategic Intelligence Agency, was heavily staffed by Christian officers, 
the Centre of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an institution with a largely Christian staff, 
became an important private think tank for government’s policies.
There was also an indication of an attempt of the ‘green’ officers to bring Islamic influence into 
the corps, or at least to construct a close relationship between Islam and the military. Harold Crouch 
argued that at the time of the February-March 1995 personnel changes, the partnership of the armed 
forces Commander-in-Chief Feisal Tanjung and Army Chief of Staff General Hartono represented a 
significant move towards more cordial military-Islamic relations8. Feisal Tanjung and Hartono were 
widely seen as Islamic military figures and had close relations with Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia (ICMI), Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals organized by Habibie. As the 
result, from 1995 to 1999, no non-Muslim officer has risen to a four-star rank in any branch of service, 
nor has a non-Muslim held any of the most significant three-star post. An interesting event in 1999 
showed an unfair competition among religions within the officers’ corps when Johny Lumintang was 
promoted to lieutenant general and assigned as commander of KOSTRAD by the president Habibie, 
Muslims general and the influential ICMI protested to assignment of a Christian to such an important 
position. Consequently, Lumintang was moved out, and replaced by a Muslim officer, Lieutenant 
General Djamari Chaniago9. However, the end of Habibie’s time in power in 1995 signaled the end 
of short time relation between the military and Islam, and the military went back to its basic position 
that is buffering political Islam from being dominant.
It can be seen here that the military also uses the religious factor as another reason to justify 
its intervention into politics. In this regard, Indonesian military has never stood far from the country’s 
politics since the 1945 Independence in order to prevent the political Islam dominating national politics, 
and also as a consequence of the domination of officer corps by the Javanese abangan Muslims.
2. Political Decision-Making Process
The concordance theory also analyzes interrelation among the three partners within the 
political decision-making process that determines important factors for the military. This involves the 
institutional organs of society that take a part in deciding military matters; structure, size, materials, 
and budget allocation. The process refers to the specific channels determining the needs and allocations 
of the military, and it is represented by parliaments, cabinets, special committees, political elites, and 
with or without the participation of military officers10.
Formally, Indonesia has an elaborate structure and process for formulating national policy, of 
which defense and security considerations are only one aspect. According to the 1945 constitution, 
political decision-making structure for defense affairs can be described: the president is the supreme 
commander of the armed forces and is assisted by the Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and 
Security (Menko Polkam), the Minister for Defense and Security (Menhankam), and the Commander- 
in-Chief TNI (Panglima TNI).
With an exception for student activists and a few number of pro-changes movements that 
always pose a challenge for some particular policies, there is virtually no institutional debates of 
defense policy, strategic concepts, force structure or budget allocations between civilian and military. 
The House of Representatives (DPR) Committee I for Foreign Affairs and Defense conducts annual 
hearings on the defense budget, but these are pro-forma appearances by Menhankam and the 
Commander-in- Chief of the armed forces and their staffs. Although Lowry argues that traces of 
8 Harold Crouch in Douglas Kammen & Siddharth Chandra. Op.cit. Page: 13.
9 Angel Rabasa & John Heseman. Op.cit. Page: 63.
10Rebecca Schiff. Op.cit. Page: 15
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inter-service rivalry can be detected between the lines in the press11, it is generally within the planning 
process only. This reflects that civilian’s determination not to be allowed to interfere in the military’s 
business, and very small chance for civilian to get involved in defense policy-making.
It is also important to notice that the military has influential power in parliament. Although 
the military and police representation was reduced from 75 to 38 and was scheduled to be phased 
out of the DPR and regional parliaments by 2004 as a consequence of the TNT’s ‘new reform’, the 
military still has the power to control the decision-taking process through the link between the TNI 
headquarters and the parliament and close relationship between military officers and the dominant 
parties’ leaders.
There is a strong indication of close relations between the winner party of the 1999 general 
election, Partai Demokrasi indonesia-Perfuangan (PDI-P) or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 
and the military elites, although it is ironic because the PDI-P was a victim of military repression during 
the Suharto era. The tie has been made of the common nationalist outlook of the PDI-P and the military 
that they committed to preservation of the Indonesian nation unity. For instance, either agreed that there 
is no possibility for Aceh and Irian Jaya to be separated from the republic. There are several retired 
generals who have joined the PDI-P and the Megawati’s cabinet for particular important positions. 
Megawati appointed three retired military officers in her cabinet, Susilo Bambang Yndhoyono, Agum 
Gumelar, and Hari Sabarno, for positions as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, 
Minister of Transportation, and Minister for Internal Affairs, respectively. Although the position of 
Minister of Defense has been given to civilian officer, it is not significantly enough in representing 
civil supremacy because the three ministries held by the military are more crucially important. 
Another military officer who has longstanding close relations with Megawati is Hendropriyono. This 
retired lieutenant general was appointed by Megawati as director of the reorganized state agency, 
Badan Intelejen Nasional (BIN), and he was a key player in helping Megawati contain the security 
threats unleashed by the upsurge of Muslim militancy in response to the US war on terrorism. 
` The military support for Megawati, or more precisely the PDI-P, can be seen n the event of 
the Gus Dur’s fall in 2001 when the military played a crucial role in forcing Gus Dur (Abdurrabman 
Wahid) from his presidency and elevating Megawati as his successor. The military’s involvement 
in the 2001 succession crisis rejecting Gus Dur’s order to declare the emergency situation and to 
apply the martial law can be seen as violence to the constitution. The 1945 Constitution clearly states 
that the president is the supreme commander for the armed forces and the declaration of a state 
of emergency is absolutely on the president’s hand. Therefore, it can be argued that the military’s 
withdrawal of support for president that paved the way for Megawati to the presidential palace was 
obviously unconstitutional means. As further evidence of close ties between the president and the 
military, in September 2002, Megawati used her position as the General Chairwoman of the PDI-P 
interfering political-decision making in the regional house of representatives of Jakarta in order to 
elevate General Sutiyoso as the governor for the capital of Indonesia. Moreover, in May 2004, the 
military succeeded in persuading parliament and Megawati’s government for an unwilling President 
Wahid to use military forces in addressing separatist movement in Aceh, in which the martial law has 
been taken to secure order in the province and no less than 30,000 troops have been deployed against 
around 5.000 armed rebels. This was a contrast decision to PDI-P political issue of campaign when 
Megawati’s political speech before the presidential election in 1999 implicitly criticized the military 
operations conducted in Aceh.
An agreement between civilian and the military can also be found in addressing the military 
budget. As it noted earlier that although the House of Representatives conducts annual hearing for 
the military budget, civilians have never given any significant objection for the military’s proposal 
11Robert Lowry. Op.cit. Page: 18.
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on defense budget. This is based on the civilians’ realization that they have no choice because of the 
fact that the Indonesian central budget has never fully funded the military needs. It is estimated that 
only 25 to 30 percent of the military’s funding comes from the government budget, and the military 
must raise the rest on its own12. This is always being the main reason for the military to get involved 
in economic sectors and to conduct several business activities.
The Indonesian military’s involvement in the economy has been happening since the early 
time of the independence struggle. Historically, during the Revolutionary War, the military were 
engaged in business to carry out economic guerrilla war against the Dutch. The aim was to seek 
funds needed to finance the war and revolution with regards that at the time civilian government has 
surrendered to the Dutch13. The military’s participation in the economy increased sharply in 1957 
when the Dutch enterprises were nationalized. Military personnel were placed in prominent positions 
in these enterprises, allowing the military to develop an economic network that it was able to generate 
income in the deteriorating economic climate of the later Sukarno years. The military’s economic role 
largely expanded again under the Suharto’s New Order when the military ran an extensive business 
structure including natural-resource extraction, finance, real estate, manufacturing, construction, etc.
Besides the official defense budget from government that only represents no more than 
one-third of the military’s overall income, there are three other funds sources that regarded as the 
military’s business ventures. First, the military runs business through the state enterprises. The 
most important of state companies for the military are Pertamina (Perusahaan Tambang Minyak 
Negara), the state oil corporation, and Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik), the state agency for logistics 
that controls the distribution of rice and other commodities. There are also large state enterprises 
operating in the infrastructure (telecommunication and electricity) and banking sectors. In addition to 
military management or control of states enterprises, retired senior officers were routinely appointed 
as directors of both public and private firms14.
Second, military cooperatives and foundations also contribute a significant proportion in 
providing the military’s funds. The military cooperatives run wholesale distribution business that 
provide affordable basic necessities and relieve operational and personnel costs not covered by the 
central budget. The structure of the cooperatives is hierarchical in every branch of service. The main 
level is at the TNI headquarters that also known as induk (literally ‘mother’). At regional level, either 
Kodam and major Air Force or naval base maintains pusat (centre) cooperatives, and at the Korem or 
unit level maintains primer (primary) cooperatives. Funding for those cooperatives comes from two 
sources: member dues and holding companies15. Military foundations are also known as yayasan, in 
which most are subordinate to cooperatives. The TNI headquarters, army, navy, air force, all have 
their yayasan and even the Ministry of Defense has two of its own. The yayasan are chartered as 
charitable foundations exempt from taxation and also from the law that forbids active-duty military 
officers from being involved in business activities.
Third, there are a lot of non-institutional business activities conducted by retired and active-
duty military personnel and their families outside of the official military business network. The military 
as an institution is not involved at this level, but individuals and groups of individuals are. This range 
of economic activities encompasses business operations in both the formal and the informal business. 
12Angel Rabasa & John Heseman. 2002. Op.cit. Page: 69.
13 Salim Said. 1991. Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 
1945-1949. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Page: 91-122.
14Harold Crouch. 1987. The Army and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Page: 67-68.
15 Robert Lowry. 1996. The Armed Forces of Indonesia. New South Wales: Allen & Unwin. Page: 
137-139.
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The formal business is usually known as ‘facilitation’ where military officers charge a fee to help 
other businesses win contracts or get licenees to conduct particular activities. The military can also 
offer insurance against future disorder and uncertainty. Informal sector practices include hiring out 
military non-weapon equipments and vehicles, selling fuel and spare parts, and selling commodities 
from military cooperatives to local communities. It is important to note that the value of military 
business is greater in the informal sector than it is in the formal one.
Until the fall of the Suharto regime, the military’s involvement in the economy was always 
an untouchable issue for civilian’s intervention. With the onset of ‘reform’ in 1998, the rationale 
for the military’s involvement in business began to be questioned. Reformers, including from the 
military itself, recognized that even though military’s businesses provide jobs for both many civilians 
and military retirees and have solved the problem of the defense budget insufficiency, the system 
of military self-financing had also serious negative effects. The military’s involvement in business 
activities stands as a major obstacle to the democratization process of Indonesia in general, and 
more particularly the TNI’s evolution into a modem professional military force. Without complete 
control and transparency of the military budget, parliamentary control of the TNI will remain fragile. 
However, there is a wide recognition among civilian and the military that it would be difficult to 
withdraw the military from its economic activities without providing sufficient defense budget that 
satisfy the operational needs of the military. As the Minister of Defense Juwono noted that military 
withdrawal from economic cannot be done without economic recovery16.
Although Rebecca Schiff argues that the concordance theory allows the military’s involvement 
in economy as long as it acquires an agreement between the political elites, the military and the 
citizenry17, the military’s business links pose a threat of military intervention into civilian political 
spheres. The military’s involvement in economic activities has many serious problems that endanger 
the civilian supremacy. It fostered corruption and illegal activities, harmed readiness, created 
disparities in the compensation of officers with varying access to off-budget funding, eroded ethical 
standards, permitted unhealthy independence from government budgetary oversight and control, and 
produced commercial values inconsistent with military professionalism. Taking the concordance 
theory into Indonesian case of political decision-making process, it can be seen that cultural factors 
and the agreement of the three partners have failed to prevent domestic military intervention.
3. Recruitment Method
Recruitment can be defined as the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces. At this regard, 
Schiff borrows Finer’s method of military recruitment that there are two models: coercive and 
persuasive18. Coercive recruitment can be defined as forcible conscription that people give their time 
temporarily in military service as a citizenship obligation for the country. Persuasive recruitment 
implies a voluntary will of the citizenry to be in military service without a force from the government.
From the early time of Independence, military recruitment has never been a problem for 
Indonesia, neither for the senior officers’ level, non-commissioned officers’ nor for the enlisted 
soldiers’ level. Historically, Salim Said points out that the first form of Indonesian military was a self-
created army where many young men (pemuda) and ex-Japanese-trained militias took the initiative 
themselves to create the defense army of the new-born Republic19. The pemuda first began seizing 
arms from Japanese soldiers and simultaneously started to organize themselves into many forms of 
16Angel Rabasa & John Heseman. Op.cit. Page: 78.
17 Rebecca Schiff. 1995. “Civil-Military Relations: A Theory of Concordance”. Armed Forces & 
Society. Vol. 22:1. Page: 14.
18Rebecca Schiff. Op.cit. Page: 16.
19Salim Said. Loc.cit.
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‘freedom fighters’ organization. This action was driven by the common realization of society of the 
need to establish armed forces in order to secure order and defend the Independence from any possible 
threat. Until the 1949 rationalization and restructurization of the armed forces, there was no formal 
model of recruitment conducted by the government. During the period of 1945-1949, many citizens 
participated in the Independence struggle and they could voluntarily join any armed organization, 
either the formal army under the central government or partisan militias (lasykar).
The trend of voluntary recruitment continues until today. Every year the military recruits 
hundreds of young men for senior, non-commissioned and enlisted officer positions, whereas there 
are thousands with at least the minimum level of education required who apply for those positions. 
For senior officer positions of all branches of service, the military academy that is conducted by the 
TNI’s headquarters recruits about 1000 new cadets every year with very competitive requirements 
such as having formal education at least secondary level with good scores in all subjects, physically 
and mentally fine, and having good behavior certificate from police. Meanwhile, several territorial 
institutions also conduct recruitment coordinated by the TNI’s headquarters for non-commissioned 
officers and enlisted soldiers.
The majority of the TNI’s most senior officers -of all branches of service- come from the 
military system. All cadets attend Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN) or the national military academy 
in Magelang for the first year. While army cadets remain in Magelang for three more years, navy and 
air force cadets move to the navy academy in Surabaya and the air force academy in Yogyakarta, 
respectively. The Indonesian military academy system does not grant an academic degree. Much 
of its curriculum, at all levels, is devoted to intense sociopolitical indoctrination and concentrates 
on instilling respect for discipline and cohort bonding through very tough and demanding physical 
training. Since 1995, there have been several programs planned to expand the academic curriculum 
to include granting of degrees, in cooperation with selected universities20.
There is variation of recruitment pattern for non-commissioned officers among branches of 
service. After selected by KODAM’s special committee of recruitment, the Army recruits undergo 
three months initial training with their KODAM training regiment. For special training such as 
artillery or armored vehicles training, recruits should attend centralized corps schools, many of which 
are located around Bandung. Meanwhile, the Navy trains its non-commissioned officers centralized 
in Surabaya. The Air Force has similar pattern of training to the navy, but located in Yogyakarta.
Although Schiff argues that this model of voluntary recruitment is based on ‘beliefs’ that the 
sacrifice of military service is worthwhile for the sake of security, patriotism, or nationalism21, with 
the exception of the period of the Independence struggle 1945-1949, the Indonesian voluntary model 
of military recruitment seems still far for taking such idealistic reasons into account. Otherwise, 
rationality plays an important role for explaining why people ‘willingly offer themselves’ for the 
need of enlistment into the Indonesia armed forces. There are two main reasons for Indonesian 
voluntary model of recruitment. First, there is common perception in Indonesian middle class society 
particularly in rural areas that a military personnel deserves a higher status than ordinary people. 
The family status would be increase and family members would be proud if at least one of their 
relatives becomes a soldier whatever the rank he gains. This perspective is based on belief that one 
with arm represents power to obtain or defend his (family) interests. Moreover, as the result of the 
TNI’s dwi fungsi a military career is frequently considered as the best way to reach the top level of 
power and wealth in society. In general, we may draw an assumption that the military possesses many 
advantages over other groups in Indonesian society as the consequence of the historical success of 
the military in defending independence during the revolution and in suppressing several rebellions 
20Robert Lowry. Op.cit. Page: 120.
21Rebecca Schiff. Op.cit. Page: 15.
KRITIS    Jurnal Sosial Ilmu Politik
Universitas Hasanuddin
203
Vol. 1, No. 2, Desember 2015
throughout the country.
Second, Indonesia suffers a high level of unemployment and underemployment, and therefore 
the military is seen as one of the institutions that provide jobs for those people. While it is estimated 
about 13 million people who unemployed today, every year the military regularly recruits thousands for 
cadets, non-commissioned and enlisted officers. Since 1995 the Army also accepts tertiary graduates 
with first degrees or diplomas for staff and command officers. The Air Force and the Navy also recruit 
officers on short-term enlistment for specialist jobs such as doctors and engineering22. Although the 
tertiary graduates and specialist jobs recruitment are only conducted periodically, usually once for 
three years depending on the need of particular positions, they are significant along with regular 
recruitmentin absorbing number of unemployment in Indonesia.
While Indonesian government does not need to coerce its people into military service due to 
those two reasons, it can be seen that historical and cultural factors are critical in understanding the 
voluntary model of Indonesian military recruitment. However, in contrast to Schiff’s argument that 
persuasive recruitment can allow concordance between the military and civilian in order to prevent 
domestic military intervention23, the voluntary model of military recruitment in Indonesia that has 
been driven by historical and cultural factors has failed in explaining the longstanding military 
intervention into politics.
4. Military Style
According to Schiff, military style refers to the appearance of the military and the inner mental 
constructions associated with it24. Taking the Schiff’s model explaining interrelation between cultural 
factors and military style, this section explores the elements of Indonesian military style, such as what 
the Indonesian military looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it.
The uniform has always been one significant symbol in describing what the military looks 
like. The Indonesian military uniform of the three branches of service were distinguished by color 
and style, with variations in headgears and other details distinguishing some elite troops, who wear 
various colors of berets. The Army working and ceremonial uniforms are olive drab, while the Air 
force and the Navy uniforms are medium blue and navy blue, respectively. In ceremonial and service 
dress, senior officers wear their rank insignia on the shoulder epaulet while the non-commissioned 
wear them on the sleeves.
However, the Indonesian military style, in general, is frequently seen and known by the 
society with its field uniform. Most of the Indonesian military units and groups wear the tiger’s striped 
camouflage as their field uniforms. With the exception of the Kopassus (the Army’s elite forces) 
who wears red and brown color for their tiger’s striped camouflage uniform, the field uniform for all 
units consist black and green colors. Unit’s symbol on sleeves signifies soldier’s unit or brigade, but 
the color of the beret is much understandable for society to identify the soldier’s group or corps he 
belongs to. For example, the kopassus (army) is recognised as ‘the red beret corps’, the green berets 
for the KOSTRAD (army) and the airborne battalions (army), the brown berets for the artillery units 
(army), the black berets for armored vehicles/cavalry battalions (army), the yellow berets for the 
kopaskhas (the Air Force Special Force Command), and the violet berets for the Marine corps (navy).
There is an assumption that the military wants the stigma of the military’s term of 
‘professionalism’ to be constructed within the society. The term of ‘professionalism’ here is very 
22Robert Lowry. Op.cit. Page: 118.
23Rebecca Schiff. Op.cit. Page: 15.
24 Ibid.
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different from the Huntington’s concept of military’s professionalism25, rather it refers to particular 
ability and effectiveness in governing and maintaining the unity of the nation. In this regard, the 
military style represents the advantage of military’s professionalism over its civilian counterpart. The 
assumption of military ‘professionalism’ is based on historical experience of military disappointment 
of the civilian’s ‘incompetence’ in governing the country. As it noted before that during the Revolution, 
the military has successfully saved the republic through guerrilla warfare when Sudirman rejected to 
follow Sukarno’s surrender to the Dutch in 1948. In addition, the military also showed its capability 
in suppressing many separatist movements throughout the country during the Sukarno’s era.
Although the military’s professionalism is still questioned in many cases regarding the lack of 
discipline and morale, the assumption that the military is more professional than its civilian counterpart 
has in general been accepted by the society. In many occasions, the military style (or half-military 
style) including military’s structure, tradition ad symbol, manifests within civilian’s practical life. For 
example, government officers from central to local institutions are required to practice the military 
model of short ceremony that called as apel in the morning and afternoon before returning home 
from Tuesday to Friday, and the flag rising ceremony on every Monday morning. The similar practice 
has been applied to students up to high senior level in order to increase their nationalism. In many 
government’s service and institutions, there is a green military-like uniform wore by civilian officers 
on particular days, usually on thursday. This military replicated uniform is well known as Hansip 
(Pertahanan Sipil) or Civil Defence uniform. According to Schiller, the civilian adoption of the military 
style that has a significant effect in political culture is in the APDN (Akademi Pemerintahan Dalam 
Negeri) or the Academy of Home Affairs in Jatinangor near Bandung, a most prominent education 
institution for civil service officers26. This civilian education institution replicates the model of Akmil 
(Akademi Militer), the Military Academy including its uniform, structure and tradition. Like in the 
Military Academy, the APDN students are also called as Taruna that means cadets, and they may be 
misinterpreted easily as military cadets regarding their military-like uniforms. The curriculum is much 
similar to it is used in the Military Academy, includes nationalism and sociopolitical indoctrination, 
respect for discipline, and even official marching and basic training of arms use. Consequently, the 
graduates of the APDN who most of them became prominent leaders in governmental institutions 
apply the military or half-military style in their work environments and require this style to their 
employees.
The civilian adoption of the military style, symbolized by the uniform and tradition, represents a 
successful effort of the military in stigmatizing the civilian with the claim that military is integrated part 
of the society. As Indonesian military officers always state in many occasions that there is no boundary 
between the military and the society by using slogan ‘Risen from the people, Owned by the people, 
A part of the people’27. Despite the civilian acceptance of good values in military’s professionalism 
such as effectiveness, coordination, and uniformity, the military style poses negative effects into the 
society. It can be argued that the civilian adoption of military style has directly or indirectly paved the 
way for the military to interfere civilian’s affairs including its political spheres. Moreover, it has also 
contaminated the civilian culture with values and tradition that may be inappropriate for a democratic 
society such as centralization model and the culture of violence. In this regards, Liem Soei Liong 
argues that the Indonesian military has played a significant role in cultivating the seeds of violence 
25 Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. The Soldier and the State. Cambridge Mass.: The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press.
26John Schiller & Barbara Martin Schiller. 1997. Imagining Indonesia: Cultural Politics and Political 
Culture. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies. Page: 14.
27Ian MacFarling. 1996. The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics In 
Indonesia. Australian Defense Studies Center. Page: 5.
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in the civilian culture resulting in continuous communal conflict among the groups of society in 
Indonesia, where the military frequently gets involved as a key player28 (Liong, 2002). At this point 
we may draw an assumption that the military style does not always achieve the agreement of the idea 
of civilian supremacy, but it sometimes appears in encouraging domestic military intervention. As 
the previous three indicators of concordance, the military style is another factor that has significant 
influence on the existence of domestic military intervention in Indonesia.
2. CONCLUSIONS
It is true that historical and cultural factors have played important roles in shaping civil-
military relations in Indonesia. However, they fail to construct the authority of the civil sphere over 
the military as the main objective of the most civil-military relations theories. In many aspects of 
concordance, the Indonesian military even uses the specific historical and cultural conditions of the 
nation to develop and justify its political role.
The study found that in the case of Indonesia, Rebecca Schiff’s theory of concordance has 
failed to provide the links between the agreement among the three partners (military, political elites, 
and society) and the civilian supremacy over the military. Historical and cultural factors as Schiff 
suggests as elements to encourage the absence of military intervention in politics, have been direct 
and indirect driving force for the occurrence of the Indonesian military socio-political roles.
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